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This article provides a comparative and longitudinal analysis of the policy selection methods 
adopted by Northern Ireland’s five main parties. Drawing on data from multiple sources it 
sheds light on an important element of intra-party democracy and party organisation in the 
region. Accounting for instances of reform, this article reveals the extent to which the parties 
have altered their procedures following the introduction of devolved power-sharing in 1998. 
Policy development is revealed to be primarily top-down in nature, with a clear 
professionalisation of the process in recent times. In a concurrent development, parties have 
also adopted a more proactive and, typically, consultative approach to policy development, 
affording ordinary members greater opportunities to register their views. However, such 
consultation also privileges several actors outside the parties’ boundaries, a finding which 
raises questions concerning both their organisational integrity and the nature and meaning of 
conventional party membership in Northern Ireland. 
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Policy formulation remains a key function performed by political parties (Dalton et al 2011: 
224). As vehicles for political expression and collective decision-making, parties bring 
structure to the political realm, translating mass preferences into policy choices (Gallagher et 
al 2001: 272; Gauja, 2013a). The process of policy selection also has implications for intra-
party democracy. Who is involved in the process of formulating policy – and the extent and 
nature of such involvement – reveals much about the distribution of power and authority within 
a political party (Gauja, 2013b). A greater understanding of the process of policy selection 
leads to a better understanding of the dynamic and relationships within parties as purposive 
organisations. 
 This article provides an empirical analysis of the policy selection procedures adopted 
by political parties in Northern Ireland. Students of Northern Irish politics currently lack a 
systematic account of this crucial area of intra-party organisation. The analysis is exploratory 
in nature and addresses similar questions raised in other studies of policy selection (see Gauja, 
2013a; Pedersen, 2010): what types of policy-related participation do the parties prefer their 
members to engage in? What mechanisms are available for policy development? Who 
participates in the process and what is the extent, quality and meaningfulness of such 
participation? By focusing on how party policy is typically formulated in Northern Ireland this 
study makes a contribution to what remains an under-researched area of party organisation 
(Allern and Pedersen, 2007: 20-1). 
 This article also considers significant changes in each of the party’s policy-making 
structures, situating Northern Ireland’s parties in a wider context of contemporary party 
organisational change. Faced with declining levels of membership participation, increased 
media coverage of their activities and concerns surrounding the representative nature of those 
activists who remain involved in the process, many parties have altered the way in which they 
develop policy. Branch meetings and conferences are now increasingly regarded as ineffective 
or unsuitable fora for policy development, with parties engaging their members through 
alternative means such as direct ballots, policy commissions or wider consultation processes 
(Scarrow et al 2000; Gauja, 2013a). Increasing numbers of parties, including those in Britain, 
have also moved to embrace web-based technologies when formulating policy, creating online 
forums and discussion boards (Gibson and Ward, 1998; Margetts, 2006). This trend has even 
given rise to a new organisational variant in the ‘network party’ (Heidar and Saglie, 2003). 
 In a concurrent development, parties have demonstrated an increasing proclivity to 
afford extra-party actors a role in the policy process. Gauja’s (2013a: 14) study of policy 
development in three Westminster democracies identifies a ‘shift towards more consultative 
forms of participation and the engagement of party supporters and the wider community at the 
expense of traditional channels of communication that privileged the party membership’. This 
practice is dubbed ‘policy outsourcing’, with parties now increasingly likely to ‘go beyond’ or 
‘open up’ their organisational boundaries to tap the sentiment of private citizens (Gauja, 2013a: 
Ch. 6). Such outsourcing can involve establishing various strata of membership types, such as 
‘registered supporters’, or conducting public consultations (see Young, 2013; Scarrow, 2014). 
Parties might also draw on other expert resources when formulating policy. Gauja (2013a: 49) 
describes the practice of consulting with interest groups and ‘think tanks’ as ‘routine’ among 
parties. In Britain, ‘think tanks’ play a central role in the policy development process (Webb, 
2002; Denham and Garnett, 1999). Elias’ (2012) evaluation of party policy-making in Wales 
also highlights the increased involvement of lobbyists and civil society actors. The extent to 
which Northern Ireland’s parties conform to these wider trends is therefore of potential interest 
to party scholars in the region. 
 
The article consists of seven sections. The first section addresses the specific context of 
the Northern Ireland case. As a devolved power-sharing democracy we might expect parties’ 
policy-making processes to be structured and/or to have developed in a certain way. Sections 
2 to 6 then provide a detailed overview and analysis of each of the five main Northern Ireland 
political parties’ policy-making processes. This analysis relies on data from a range of sources. 
A total of 41 interviews with political elites were conducted in 2013-14, with interviewees 
selected on account of their proximity to or knowledge of the policy development process 
within their party (e.g. party officials, elected representatives). Historical party documents were 
also analysed and the author observed proceedings at a number of party conferences from 2011-
14. The analysis also integrates findings from a postal survey of candidates in the 2011 
Northern Ireland Assembly and local government elections.3 The final section of the paper 
draws together the findings from the individual party case-studies to provide an overview of 
policy-making within Northern Ireland, highlighting the extent to which the trends of 
professionalisation, increased membership involvement and policy outsourcing have taken 
hold in the region. 
 
Policy selection in Northern Ireland: a special case? 
 
 
From a comparative perspective, Northern Ireland represents an especially intriguing case-
study of policy selection. As a consociational democracy parties may be incentivised to adopt 
certain organisational features. The relationship between a party’s environment and how it 
chooses to organise itself is a central theme in the party organisational literature (see Cross and 
Katz, 2013: 5). Firstly, consociation is an elite-driven approach to conflict resolution (Lijphart, 
1977: 53-4; Schneckener, 2002). The theory prioritises a notable degree of leadership security, 
power and influence vis-à-vis other intra-party actors, including party members. Comparative 
research on parties in consociational democracies (both past and present), for instance, 
identifies an ‘oligarchic’ tendency for centralised decision-making and ‘the predominance of 
‘vertical’ power games, strongly biased in favour of [political party] leaders’ (Luther, 1999: 
56). Critics of consociation also decry its elitist complexion (see O’Leary, 2005: 6).  Such a 
complexion, therefore, has potential implications for intra-party democracy. It suggests that 
parties will be incentivised to favour an internal structure which privileges party elites (i.e. the 
leadership) over ordinary party members in a clear ‘top-down’ hierarchy in which they enjoy 
‘considerable independent power’ (Lijphart, 1977: 50). 
 This picture of oligarchy is, however, tempered by another related structural condition 
of consociation, that of parties with strong organisational presence within their communities. 
As Nordlinger (1972) posited, only mass parties with extensive organisational capabilities can 
provide for the ‘structured elite predominance’ required for a successful consociational 
venture. Political parties (led by the all-important elites) must boast considerable ‘linkage’ with 
civil society, be that through membership or ancillary organisations (see Luther and 
Deschouwer, 1999; Lijphart, 1977: Ch. 8). Crucially, Nordlinger notes that ‘structured elite 
predominance is usually tempered with a good measure of responsiveness to non-elite wishes 
and demands’ (1972: 73). From an intra-party perspective, therefore, while the ideal 
consociational scenario will see strong and secure party leaders, such security (likely) depends 
on clear lines of communication between these elites and non-elites (party members and/or 
supporters). The question in respect of policy selection in Northern Ireland therefore is: are 
these channels of communication in place? 
 Research on coalition formation and bargaining also suggests that consociational 
power-sharing might prove a hostile environment for a form of intra-party democracy which 
privileges party members. Bäck (2008: 75) notes the widely-shared view that ‘highly 
democratic decision-making procedures are likely to constrain party leaders in bargaining, 
which will render parties characterized by such regimes less likely to be in government’. 
Pedersen’s (2010: 738) study of Danish political parties also demonstrates that parties in which 
power is located in the national party organization  find it more difficult to participate in 
legislative accommodation than those where the internal balance of power favours 
parliamentary groups. Gauja (2013b: 131) has also demonstrated that, ‘an internally democratic 
policy process may not be conducive to effective and responsive governance’, as parties, ‘in 
which decision-making power is located within the party’s membership, will find it more 
difficult to participate in governing coalitions’ (see also Gauja, 2013a: 28). 
 The issue of intra-party democracy in Northern Ireland is lent further salience when we 
consider that consociationalism ensures that all major parties are essentially guaranteed 
governmental status. Northern Ireland’s main parties are (typically) always ‘in’ government 
and rarely ‘out’. This raises the issue of the relationship between intra-party democracy and 
legislative importance, and the observation that the closer a party comes to power the more 
likely power is concentrated among a small elite (see Koelble, 1989; Bolleyer, 2009) As 
Poguntke observed (2001: 8), ‘the structural requirements of parliamentary politics’ 
necessitates that the internal balance of power favours party elites over party members (see 
also Katz, 2001: 124). This process has been dubbed the ‘governmentalization’ (Müller, 1994: 
73) of parties and underpins the cartel party thesis (Katz and Mair, 1995).  
 As well as being a power-sharing democracy, Northern Ireland is one of the regions of 
the United Kingdom to which power has been devolved from Westminster. This article will 
therefore consider the extent to which devolution has resulted in organisational change within 
Northern Ireland’s parties. The introduction of devolved power-sharing in 1998 transformed 
the environment in which the parties operated. Such environmental change, as Katz (1997: 31-
2) notes, ‘may […] lead to changes in the internal life of parties, as well as to changes in the 
balance among parties’. Elias’ (2012) study of the effects of devolution on policy development 
in Wales, for example, identified a professionalisation of the process and increased 
involvement of external stakeholders. One question worth posing, therefore, is to what extent 
can similar trends and changes be observed in Northern Ireland? 
 
 
Democratic Unionist Party 
 
 
The Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) policy process is choreographed by a central ‘Policy 
Unit’. This unit has no counterpart in the party’s structures and enjoys significant latitude when 
formulating policy. All policy  generated by the Policy Unit is subject to approval by the Party 
Officer team and ratified by the ‘Central Executive Committee’ (CEC), a delegate body which 
affords representation to a cross-section of the party (see Table 2). While a vehicle for 
grassroots involvement the CEC is not a particularly effective forum for policy development 
and policies brought before it are usually ‘rubber-stamped’ following brief discussion in the 
vast majority of cases (interview, 3 May 2013). 
 DUP policy is primarily initiated at leadership level or by those within the 
parliamentary party (MLAs and MPs). DUP ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive or the 
party’s spokespeople have primacy in their issue area and work closely with the Policy Unit to 
develop policy (interview, 16 April 2013). DUP interviewees stressed the ‘top-down’ nature of 
policy development within the party: 
 
We are certainly not a bottom-up party. Our policies tend to trickle down. 
… Both the leader and deputy leader would be very involved in setting party 
policy. The DUP has always been built on a certain amount of trust in its 
leadership and very much the culture has always been if the leadership are 
saying ‘go for it’ then the party will go with that (interview, 12 May 2014). 
 
 
While the DUP holds an annual conference it does not perform an explicit policy-making 
function. Rather than afford the extra-parliamentary party an opportunity to ratify or propose 
policy this forum consists of keynote speeches and panel discussions on specific policy areas. 
DUP officials downplayed conference’s deliberative capacity, emphasising instead its 
importance as a ‘social gathering’ and public relations exercise (interview, 8 May 2013). This 
approach is reflective of the DUP’s origins and long-held organisational culture as a ‘protest’ 
party (Tonge et al 2014) with conference primarily a means for the leadership to galvanise the 
grassroots. 
 Results from our survey of DUP candidates reveals the extent to which policy 
development within the party is a top-down enterprise (see Table 1). Of the various actors 
involved in the process the party leader is regarded as the most important, with 92 per cent of 
respondents describing them as ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ influential. The DUP’s parliamentary 
group (MLAs and MPs) and party officers are ranked as the next most influential actors in 
setting policy direction.2 Tellingly, the extra-parliamentary party is attributed a comparatively 
low degree of influence. Close to 80 per cent of respondents attribute local associations and 
members negligible influence. Conference, as discussed, is also deemed largely uninfluential. 
And while the Party Executive (CEC) is accorded a reasonably high degree of influence, this 











Table 1.  DUP candidates’ perceptions of the influence of party organs on party’s 















%         n 
 
Party leader 4 4 28 64 100 69 
Party executive 7 23 43 26 100 69 
Party officers 4 25 49 21 100 67 
Party council 10 33 45 12 100 58 
Parliamentary team (MPs) 6 22 51 22 100 69 
Assembly team (MLAs) 1 28 52 19 100 69 
Local councillors 36 35 26 3 100 69 
Party conference/AGM 28 41 20 10 100 68 
Local party associations 30 49 16 3 100 68 
Ordinary party members 35 43 19 1 100 68 
       
Source: Northern Ireland Candidates Survey 2011 (Assembly and local government) 
 
 
 The top-down nature of policy development within the DUP perhaps comes as little 
surprise to those conversant with popular perceptions of the party’s general organisational 
culture. However, in an interesting development the DUP has adopted a more consultative 
approach to policy selection since the advent of devolved power-sharing in 1998 and the party’s 
entry into government with Sinn Féin in 2007 especially. While policy tends to originate at 
leadership level the DUP now utilizes several mechanisms designed to tap the sentiment of 
ordinary members as well as DUP supporters in the wider populace. Since 2011 the DUP has 
established ‘Policy Development Forums’ (PDFs) to disseminate policy ideas throughout the 
party. These ad hoc working groups are designed to be ‘small representative groups of the 
membership around the province’ (interview, 3 April 2013) and while originally intended to 
operate as thematic working groups adopted practice has instead seen them consulted on a 
range of issues at once. Since 2011, the DUP has also employed a dedicated ‘Communications 
and Development’ officer to act as a conduit between those involved in policy development 
and the membership (interview, 8 May 2013). This officer also assists branches in improving 
their organisation with the part aim of encouraging members to become more active, not least 
in formulating policy (interview, 30 May 2013). Tellingly, the creation of this new role was a 
direct response to internal criticism of a ‘disconnect’ between the party grassroots and central 
leadership (interview, 1 May 2013; see also Tonge et al 2014: 73-74).  
Since 2012 the DUP has also organised an annual ‘Spring Policy Conference’. Open to 
all members this forum facilitates small group-based discussion on specific policy issues. While 
not binding, members can vote on an issue, allowing those in the Policy Unit to gauge levels of 
support. These conferences are closed to the media and so represent a more effective and 
‘honest’ forum for policy debate than the annual conference (interview, 16 April 2013). Along 
with the introduction of  ‘PDFs’ and the appointment of a policy liaison officer, the 
establishment of these policy conferences can be viewed as an indication that the DUP has, in 
recent years, taken a more proactive approach to consulting its membership when formulating 
policy. This trend towards greater grassroots consultation is, in large part, a consequence of the 
party’s increased size and significant electoral growth since the early 2000s. Originally 
conceived as a ‘party of protest’ the DUP’s role in government has transformed the party into, 
‘a traditional political party’, a role change which has affected the party’s organisational setting 
and culture (interview, 12 May 2014; see also Tonge et al 2014). 
While the DUP has afforded its rank-and-file greater ‘voice’ in policy formulation in 
recent years it has also demonstrated a concurrent willingness to consult with the wider 
(unionist) electorate on a range of issues. Since the early 2000s the party has regularly 
conducted focus groups on key policy areas (interview, 24 May 2013). The DUP also consults 
with a wide range of external stakeholders when developing policy. The first port of call for 
the party’s Policy Unit and/or spokespersons will most often be ‘outside experts’ whose input 
will typically provide the impetus for certain policy or nudge the party in a particular direction 
(interview, 16 April 2013). Since 1998 these groups have, it would appear, grown in strength 
and influence, employing more staff ‘to encourage that level of interaction’ (interview, 24 May 
2013). While an in-depth examination of the influence of such stakeholders on the policy 
process is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible to identify a set of actors outside the 
DUP’s organisation playing a role in the process. 
 
A final example of the DUP’s willingness to look beyond its membership when 
formulating policy is the party’s adoption of a membership category known as a ‘Registered 
Party Supporter’. Also introduced in 2011 this online initiative enables members of the public 
to ‘receive regular updates from the party’ and promises those who enlist ‘the opportunity to 
give your feedback’ (DUP, 2014).  Supporters can attend party conference and are ‘kept 
informed of all party policy and developments within the party’ (DUP, 2013). This ‘supporter’ 
option was introduced to cater for those citizens who cannot commit to the activity rate 
expected of a full member and to strengthen the party’s links with its latent support base in the 
wider community (interview, 17th April 2013).  A second motive concerned membership 
recruitment. As the first rung on the organisational ladder supporters might then be incentivised 
to enlist as full members. Its recruitment capacity aside, the success and efficacy of this venture 
as a consultative tool should not be overstated. Opportunities for these new actors to provide 
feedback on policy have been virtually non-existent. Nonetheless, this initiative does constitute 
a clear attempt by the DUP to stretch its organisational boundaries, involving a greater number 
of citizens in policy development. The potential therefore exists for ‘supporters’ to play some 
role in the process alongside ‘paid-up’ members.  
 
Social Democratic and Labour Party 
 
 
The annual conference has always been the sovereign body that determines SDLP policy. As 
with other cases the purpose of the SDLP’s conference is ‘to establish a representative 
democratic link between the final policy adopted by the party and its grassroots membership’
Table 2.     Representation on Northern Ireland parties’ main policy-making bodies 
    Formula for     
Party Overall size/ Basis of  Membership    Other Bodies 
(Forum) Attendance Representation  Representation    Represented 
SDLP ‘Several Size of local  Two delegates for first 10-20 Executive Committee; all elected representatives; Two   
(Conference) hundred’ branch  members; one extra for every  delegates from SDLP Youth, SDLP Women’s Group  
 membership  10 members thereafter  and other Support Groups  
     
      
APNI Approx. Set number  10 delegates per Constituency Party Officers; Executive Committee; All elected  
(Council) 150 for each   Association  representatives; 5 Vice Presidents; 10 delegates from 
  Constituency    Young Alliance 
  Association     
             
Sinn Féin  ‘Several Size of local Two delegates for branch of 20 National Executive; Two delegates from each regional  
(Conference) hundred’ branch members or less; 3 delegates and district executive, Republican Youth, National  
   membership  for branch of over 20 members Councillors Forum; One delegate from the Six-County 
        Parliamentary Group and 26-County Parliamentary  
      Group 
 
DUP Approx. Set number  5 delegates per Constituency Two delegates from University Associations; Four   
(Central 150 for each  Association  delegates from Young Democrats; The Party Leader and 
Executive Constituency     Deputy Leader; All MPs, MLAs, MEPs and peers 
Committee) Association   
 
UUP Approx. Set number  The Chairman, Secretary and The Leader; Party Officers; 3 members of Parliamentary  
(Executive 140 for each  Treasurer of each Constituency Party; MEPs; Executive Ministers; Leader of Assembly  
Committee) Constituency  Association plus two delegates Party, Chief Whip and 3 MLAs who are not Ministers;  
 Association  per Constituency Association Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer plus 3 other   
      members of Councillors’ Association, Young Unionists  
      and Women’s Unionist Council 
Sources: Sinn Féin (2013); APNI (2013); SDLP (2012); DUP (2013); UUP (2007)
 
 (Gauja, 2013a: 66). Local branches elect representatives to attend the conference on their behalf 
and delegate entitlement is scaled according to membership size (see Table 2). Motions can 
also be submitted by any party body, including branches and elected representatives.  
 In order to arrive at a better understanding of the ‘responsiveness and inclusiveness of 
conference as a policy-making forum’ it is necessary to consider other factors besides the 
formal rules that govern participation (Gauja, 2013a: 68). Firstly, the role perception of those 
‘representing’ local branches, whether they regard themselves as a delegate mandated to vote 
a certain way or a representative acting according to personal conscience. While attendees in 
other social democratic parties typically act as delegates (Gauja, 2013a: 49) we find no hard 
and fast rule on this issue within the SDLP and a blurring in practice between the delegate and 
representative models.  The typical scenario sees ‘delegates’ given free-rein on most issues but 
mandated on more contentious ones. The party seeks to facilitate a link between grassroots 
discussion and policy outcomes by circulating agenda to branches in advance of any meeting. 
However, the quality of discussion and the branches capacity to consider what is often a hefty 
agenda varies according to their organisational strength and priorities, which is highly variable 
(interview, 9 April 2013).  
 Secondly, the quality of deliberation at conference is an important factor when 
ascertaining its effectiveness and significance as a policy-making forum. Given the highly 
variable nature of policy debate at SDLP branch level, the onus shifts to conference to ensure 
quality discussion. Again the high volume of motions to be considered is important here. 
Typically conference will consider between 125-200 motions and the average debate on 
motions raised in a specific area lasts roughly 30 minutes. From a deliberative standpoint it is, 
therefore, difficult to expect that conference could achieve anything more substantial than 
ratification or rejection of a policy motion. As one SDLP MLA explained, ‘conference is short 
and people like to socialise’ (interview, 22 March 2013). Indeed, as well as its keen social 
aspect, the SDLP conference performs a host of other non-policy-oriented functions, including 
holding elections and hosting keynote speeches.  
In recent years the SDLP has sought to make conference a more effective forum for 
policy debate. In 2004 the party established a formal ‘Policy Secretary’ position within each 
branch whose role is ‘to stimulate policy discussion’ (SDLP, 2004).  Since 2010 the party has 
held lengthy panel discussions designed to ‘inform conference and get delegates thinking about 
some of the bigger issues and the party’s core values or principles’ (interview, 8 May 2014). 
The party has also moved to revise, if not entirely reimagine, the role played by its ‘Central 
Council’, the main forum for party-wide policy discussion between conferences. This body 
was reconstituted following a major organisational review in 2004/5; however, it is only in 
recent years that it has become an effective vehicle for policy development under its own steam 
and one which dovetails with conference (SDLP, 2010c; interview, 8 May 2014).   
The principal motor for policy generation in the SDLP is a central ‘Policy Unit’.  A 
large portion of this unit’s time is spent dealing with the parliamentary party’s everyday 
workload. However, it also facilitates policy discussion within the party; formulates policy 
initiatives; and prepares manifestos (SDLP, 2010; 2011). The unit has no authority to 
unilaterally develop policy and so works closely alongside other party actors, with party 
spokespeople typically inviting the unit to co-draft policy for discussion amongst the 
parliamentary group (MLAs and MPs) (interview, 21 March 2013).  
The extent to which policy is influenced by the SDLP’s Assembly team and at 
leadership level is revealed by our candidate survey (see Table 3). Respondents identified the 
party’s MLAs as the most influential actors, with 72 per cent viewing them as either ‘very’ or 
‘extremely’ influential in setting the party’s general policy direction. The party leader was 
deemed the second most influential actor. It is also possible to identify a neat split between the 
influence of the ‘party in public office’ and the grassroots. The three least influential organs 
are found in the extra-parliamentary party, with 42 per cent of respondents deeming the 
membership to be ‘not very’ influential. Past analyses of the SDLP’s organisation have stressed 
the dominant role played by the party’s elected representatives (see McAllister, 1977: 45; 
Mitchell, 1991: 73). It would appear that this perception endures. 
 
 
Table 3.  SDLP candidates’ perceptions of the influence of party organs on party’s 















%         n 
 
Party leader 8 25 47 19 100 59 
Party executive 13 46 30 11 100 61 
Party officers 18 53 25 3 100 60 
Party council 24 47 24 5 100 59 
Parliamentary team (MPs) 7 38 33 22 100 60 
Assembly team (MLAs) 2 27 52 20 100 60 
Local councillors 19 50 26 5 100 58 
Party conference/AGM 14 38 34 14 100 58 
Local party associations 34 44 17 5 100 59 
Ordinary party members 42 39 14 5 100 59 
       




Another body which the Policy Unit liaises closely with (and shares certain 
responsibilities) is the Policy Committee, a formal development and oversight group. Although 
its remit is wide-ranging the committee’s capacity to develop policy is constrained by the fact 
that it is a voluntary body which typically meets on a bi-monthly basis. Much of its time is also 
spent considering proposals brought to it by the Policy Unit (interview, 21 March 2013). As a 
result, the committee will typically conduct a ‘policy review’ to draft a list of policies to be 
developed or revisited by the Policy Unit. From time to time, the committee will establish 
working groups focused on developing policy on a specific issue or general area. These groups 
are regarded as more amenable to grassroots involvement, with circulars inviting members with 
an interest, expertise or background in the specific area to join (interview, 8 May 2014). 
The SDLP’s Policy Committee has seen its role in the policy process diminish with the 
establishment of devolution and the emergence of a new tier of politicians. For much of the 
party’s history, in the absence of any functioning government (beyond council level), the 
committee was the central engine of policy development and was largely populated by senior 
figures who would later assume office in 1998 (Farren, 2000; interview, 27 March 2013). 
Policy-making authority has therefore shifted from the volunteers in the Policy Committee to 
the party’s MLA grouping, as outlined by one senior official: 
 
[In] 1998 the balance of power swung to the Assembly group. Party executive, 
by and large, is responsible for organisation and fundraising but policy now 
resides with the Assembly group. … That institutional change had a major 
impact. It changed the dynamic in that the Assembly group asserted itself. It 
basically told the executive: ‘You can mind your own business in relation to 
policy matters. We are the people who are making these decisions’ (interview, 
10 April 2013) 
 
 
 Evidence also suggests that following the re-establishment of power-sharing in 2007 
the Policy Committee experienced an identity crisis. Internal reports from 2008 to 2012 detail 
a period of self-reflection on its ‘core purpose and function’ (SDLP, 2011). With most policy 
well-established and Assembly spokespersons largely autonomous regarding everyday 
political developments the committee admitted to suffering from aimlessness (SDLP, 2011). 
In 2010/11 committee members met with counterparts in Fianna Fáil and Irish Labour to 
discuss how their respective policy committees worked, while other European parties were 
assessed for best practice (SDLP, 2010). One result of this self-evaluation has been a renewed 
desire on the committee’s part to facilitate consultation on policy with various levels of the 
party and with members especially. In 2008 the practice of conducting ‘Constituency Visits’ 
was established, with committee members visiting constituencies to outline policy initiatives 
and gather members’ views. The following year the committee introduced the requirement that 
each Constituency Council hold an annual meeting at which members can discuss and 
formulate policy. Since 2010 the committee has held workshops focused on their prioritised 
policy theme to which members are invited (interview, 8 May 2014) and in 2012 members 
were invited to register their email and receive regular updates on party activity in a number of 
areas.  
By far the most innovative consultative mechanism established by the SDLP Policy 
Committee in recent years is an online ‘Policy Forum’.  Introduced in 2013, this forum is open 
only to registered members and ‘enables [them] to express their views on policy issues and 
participate in the development of SDLP policy in conversations across the party in addition to 
discussions within their branches’ (SDLP, 2014). In terms of outcome, such debate assists in 
‘reviews of existing policies and in the creation of new policies, responses to consultations and 
contributions to party manifestos’. The scheme’s architects also posited a clear link between 
online debate and policy output, with the goal of holding policy workshops following extensive 
consultation in the forums (SDLP, 2013). This discussion board, whatever of its success in 
practice, therefore, reflects a wider drive and intent by the SDLP to engage members in policy 
development.  
Finally, despite the SDLP’s moves towards a more consultative form of policy 
development in recent years the party has also sought to engage the views of those outside its 
organisation. Standard practice sees the Policy Unit consult with external stakeholders in the 
initial stages of drafting policy (interview, 21 March 2013). In recent years the SDLP has also 
used focus groups to consult the public on a number of policy areas, informing the work of 
both the Policy Unit and Committee (interview, 8 May 2014). Some policy workshops have 
been open to non-members and wider forums of public consultation have also become regular 
features of the SDLP’s policy development process (interview, 15 March 2013). Since 2012 
the party has committed itself to holding a number of large thematic policy conferences to 
which the public is invited to participate in panel discussions, with comments fed back through 
the party structures. When considering the SDLP’s policy process it is, therefore, important to 
account for the involvement of actors with no formal ties to the party. 
 
 
Alliance Party  
 
 
Alliance policy is officially approved by ‘Council’, a delegate body which meets to 
discuss resolutions on a quarterly basis. The majority of delegates represent the membership 
and proposals can be brought by any organ of the extra-parliamentary party and by party 
executive (see Table 2). In policy-making terms this body performs a similar role to a 
conventional party conference. Alliance does not specify that associations mandate their 
delegates. However, on the more contentious issues council-goers will tend to be issued with a 
mandate (interview, 5 June 2013). Proposals are circulated to associations in advance of 
meetings to facilitate discussion among members which will then inform their representatives’ 
position. However, as with the SDLP, the state of local party organisation and so the degree of 
agency enjoyed by delegates is highly variable (interview, 24 May 2013). Given the regularity 
of meetings the agenda is substantially smaller than that of a typical party conference, with 
delegates considering just a handful of motions. This concentrated schedule affords delegates 
(and members) greater opportunity to consider any proposals. A smaller agenda also represents 
a more manageable workload to a membership base which, generally speaking, is more 
preoccupied with fundraising and campaigning (interview, 28 March 2013). 
Indeed, considerations of the quality of policy deliberation by the extra-parliamentary 
party – both at association-level and at conference – partly informed a move by Alliance to 
devolve policy-making powers from its annual conference to Council in 2012. Since the party’s 
establishment in 1970 policy was debated and ratified at an annual conference. From 2010 
onwards, however, the utility of conference as a policy-making forum came under scrutiny. 
The move to strip conference of its policy-making powers was partly intended to make for 
more structured and focused debate, replacing ‘fairly meaningless resolutions’ with substantive 
policy proposals (interview, 5 June 2013). Originally a delegate body, attendance rights were 
extended to all members in 1994. As a result, policy debate ‘became very unmanageable in 
terms of the numbers involved and slightly chaotic in that people could be raising things that 
were slightly off the agenda’ (interview, 24 May 2013).  On a related note, a more 
‘professional’ approach to the party’s image in the public eye was a key consideration when 
moving policy debate behind closed doors. The party’s electoral growth in recent years has 
seen conference receive unprecedented media attention. Given such increased coverage, 
conference was no longer deemed a suitable forum for policy debate (interview, 10 May 2013). 
This concurs with a wider contemporary trend affecting party conferences in several Western 
democracies, where public relations considerations have become just as, if not more, important 
than policy debate (Seyd, 1999; Faucher-King, 2005). As a result, Alliance’s conference now 
consists of keynotes, a wider exhibition, panel discussions and fringe events.  
The vast majority of Alliance policy is formulated by various elements of the party 
besides the membership. The most important actors include a central Policy Officer, a formal 
Policy Committee and the Alliance Assembly group. Since 1998 the party has employed a 
Policy Officer who divides their time between responding to consultations, assisting Alliance 
representatives and drafting manifestos (interview, 11 May 2014). This staffer is, however, 
also involved in the formulation of proposals to be brought before executive and Council and 
identifying issues on which the party requires new or revised policy. In doing so, they work 
closely alongside a formal ‘Policy Committee’. This committee may, if required, establish 
smaller working groups focused on a specific policy area and is usually populated by 
spokespersons and interested members. The committee’s exact composition is regulated by 
executive with a small number of party officials granted ex officio status. As a result, the 
threshold to gaining a place on the committee is low, with interested members ‘pushing against 
an open door’ (interview, 17 April 2013). Despite the apparent ease with which they can gain 
access onto one of the party’s most important policy development bodies those in Alliance 
highlighted the low levels of interest among members to do so (interview, 17 April 2013). In 
an attempt to involve members in the policy process Alliance has, since 2012, conducted an 
annual consultation of its entire membership. This ‘Policy Sweep’ aggregates members’ views 
on a number of key policy areas, with data fed back through the party structures, informing the 
proposals brought before Council (interview, 11 May 2014).  
 
 
Table 4. Alliance candidates’ perceptions of the influence of party organs on party’s 















%         n 
 
Party leader 3 15 55 28 100 40 
Party executive 5 33 45 18 100 40 
Party officers 8 45 43 5 100 40 
Party council 8 34 45 13 100 38 
Parliamentary team (MPs) 5 28 56 10 100 39 
Assembly team (MLAs) 0 31 54 15 100 39 
Local councillors 15 55 30 0 100 40 
Party conference/AGM 28 45 23 5 100 40 
Local party associations 35 45 20 0 100 40 
Ordinary party members 45 43 10 3 100 40 
       




Alliance MLAs and leadership figures play a central role in developing party policy. 
Spokespersons are especially influential in identifying issues which require new or revised 
policy and will work closely alongside the Policy Officer to draft proposals. The suggestion 
that Alliance’s ‘parliamentary party’ is where the real locus of policy power lies is supported 
by findings from our candidate survey (see Table 4). The three most influential groupings are, 
in order of perceived importance, the party leader, Assembly team and parliamentary team.3 In 
contrast, the extra-parliamentary party is afforded a low degree of influence, with local 
associations and party members bottom of the list. However, rather than interpret this as a 
disenfranchisement of the grassroots, those in Alliance suggested that this reflected the spread 
of resources in the party, with full-time politicians more au fait with (and interested in) the 
‘nitty gritty’ of policy than the average member. Devolution has also resulted in the 
parliamentary party overtaking the extra-parliamentary party as the key site from which policy 
proposals emerge: 
 
We have seen a shift away from the deep political discussions happening at the 
Party Executive – which now has more of a managerial role – towards the 
Assembly Party, where most of the policy discussions would now happen 
(interview, 10 May 2013).  
 
Furthermore, as a small party with only one staffer with a policy remit and which does not 
receive state funding Alliance is heavily reliant on the voluntary contributions of its MLAs and 
their staff. As the party has acknowledged, despite the ‘handicap’ of not receiving such funding 
the strong practical role of staff and spokespersons has enabled it to ‘punch well above its 
weight in policy terms’ (APNI, 2004). Another consequence of both the party’s small size and 
lack of resources is the involvement of external stakeholders in developing policy. One 
Alliance official explained how,  ‘as a small party we are especially reliant on a little outside 
help and advice when it comes to getting policies up to scratch’ (interview, 11 May 2014).  
Faced with a deficit in terms of research capacity, those tasked with drafting policy will consult 
with lobby groups and civil society actors to benefit from their expertise. From an intra-party 
democracy perspective the involvement of these external actors in the policy process is 
noteworthy. 
Ulster Unionist Party 
 
UUP policy is officially endorsed by its executive committee, a body to which the majority of 
representatives act on behalf of local constituency associations (see Table 1). Policy can also 
be ratified at a meeting of the entire party membership under the auspices of the ‘Ulster 
Unionist Council’ (UUC). In practice, however, ratification by the UUC only occurs in 
‘extremely exceptional circumstances’ (interview, 13 March 2013). The UUC’s wings were 
clipped following a series of reforms in 2005 and 2007 which bolstered the position of the 
executive as the party’s de facto policy approval body and raised the threshold for convening 
a UUC meeting. Prior to 2005 regular meetings of the UUC were called to consider party 
policy, a practice which bedevilled past UUP leaders (Farrington, 2006).  
The UUP holds an annual conference to which members are invited. This forum can 
consider policy motions and any representative body from association-level upwards can raise 
a motion. In the round, however, the policy-making capacity of the UUP conference is 
negligible. Typically, only one or two motions are debated and these tend to be ‘broad-brush’ 
in nature, reaffirming the party’s already well-established (consensus) position (interview, 25 
April 2013).  Instead, the UUP conference agenda is mainly devoted to panel discussions, 
fringe events and leadership speeches. On occasion delegates will be presented with policy 
proposals set to be considered by executive in an attempt to encourage them to engage with 
their representatives on that body. Such occasions are, however, rare. The question then is what 
opportunities exist for UUP members to influence policy?   
 Responsibility for coordinating policy development within the UUP lies almost entirely 
with a ‘Policy Officer’ based in a small central ‘Policy Unit’. Unlike some parties, the UUP 
does not possess an elected policy development group with the party’s MLAs, leadership and 
officer team performing an equivalent function, liaising closely with the Policy Unit. The 
Policy Officer has a gamut of options available for both involving and consulting the wider 
party. Indeed, as a result of certain organisational developments in recent years, it could be 
argued that UUP members are afforded an unprecedented number of opportunities to influence 
and develop policy. 2005 saw the creation of a centralised register of party members, meaning 
that, for the first time in its history, the party possessed a comprehensive database of members’ 
contact details. This initiative was a long-held goal of intra-party ‘modernisers’ who bemoaned 
the practice of local branches or constituency associations being responsible for membership 
registration (Farrington, 2006: 44). Under this system efficient communication and widespread 
engagement with the membership on policy matters was extremely difficult, with local elites 
taking a laissez-faire approach to registration (interview, 23 April 2013). The centralisation of 
membership registration has, therefore, gone some way to liberating UUP members in terms 
of policy-making. No longer reliant on local elites as conduits, the party centre now has the 
means to directly involve members in the process. 
Other recent initiatives have strengthened the lines of communication between the UUP 
centre and periphery. In 2010, the Elliott leadership issued an appeal for members to register 
their email address with party headquarters and established the practice of a weekly ‘Leader’s 
Bulletin’ (interview, 25 April 2013). Among other things, this communique contains appeals 
to become involved in policy development.  Perhaps the clearest example of the UUP’s new-
found capacity (and willingness) to engage its members in policy development is the 
establishment of 8-10 ‘Policy Forums’ in 2012. Established at the behest of the leadership, 
these groupings are structured according to wider policy areas, loosely mirroring government 
departments. Crucially, they are composed entirely of members with a declared interest in the 
specific area (interview, 26 April 2013). The most popular groups are approximately 100-150 
members strong and discussion is typically via email (interview, 13 March 2013(3)). In many 
ways, these groupings resemble the ‘thematic networks’ central to the ‘network party’ 
typology, where discussion occurs in groups which cross-cut the traditional geographical 
branch structure (Heidar and Saglie, 2003).  
While recent years have seen the UUP adopt a more proactive approach to involving 
and consulting its membership this does not represent the typical picture of policy development 
in the party. More usual practice sees the Policy Officer work closely alongside party 
spokespeople to develop policies which will then be presented to the leadership and Assembly 
group. Approved policy then proceeds to the executive (usually via the Party Officers) for final 
endorsement. This chain-of-command, with the executive ratifying policy which has emerged 
almost entirely from the party room or leader’s office, has been identified in other studies of 
the UUP (Farrington, 2006: 38). Our candidate survey also reveals the extent to which policy 
selection in the UUP is considered a primarily elite-centric venture (see Table 5). The two most 
influential actors are the party leader and MLA team. In terms of those bodies representing the 
extra-parliamentary party, only the party executive is granted a relatively high degree of 
influence – most likely a reflection of its ultimate approval authority. Tellingly, local party 
associations and party members are ranked least influential in the process.  
 
Other new features of the UUP’s policy process also serve to counter-balance recent 
moves to afford members a more privileged role. These concern the involvement of actors 
outside the party’s formal structures. In 2013 the UUP adopted a new initiative of holding a 
series of public consultations. These meetings focused specifically on the party’s education 
policy and took place across Northern Ireland.  While members were invited to attend, the 
emphasis appears to have been on consulting with both sectoral groups and members of the 
public. 
 
[That] is the first time that we have gone outside of the party … To get not only our 
members but the public more aware of what our policy is and allowing them some input 
(interview, 13 March 2013(2), emphasis added).  
  
While a one-off case the UUP has, nonetheless, demonstrated a new-found willingness to tap 
wider public sentiment and involve extra-party actors. 
 
Table 5. UUP candidates’ perceptions of the influence of party organs on party’s 















%         n 
 
Party leader 7 21 44 27 100 70 
Party executive 12 29 41 18 100 68 
Party officers 13 32 49 6 100 69 
Party council 18 50 26 6 100 66 
Parliamentary team (MPs) 47 24 22 7 100 59 
Assembly team (MLAs) 3 36 39 22 100 67 
Local councillors 18 60 22 0 100 67 
Party conference/AGM 35 38 22 4 100 68 
Local party associations 23 58 13 6 100 69 
Ordinary party members 42 42 10 6 100 67 
       
Source: Northern Ireland Candidates Survey 2011 (Assembly and local government) 
Note: At the time of the survey the UUP had no representation at Westminster which likely explains 




The goal of formulating more ‘representative’ policy with input from the public has 
also seen the UUP engage in the recent practice (since 2011/12) of conducting focus groups on 
key policy areas. Not strictly performed for electioneering purposes these groups have directly 
informed the development of policy (interview, 17 May 2014). Typically speaking, the initial 
stages of policy development will also see the UUP Policy Unit and/or spokespersons consult 
with relevant external stakeholders. The involvement of these extra-party actors is necessary 
to make up for a ‘knowledge deficit’ on the part of both central staff, given their small numbers 
and the resources available to them, and the party membership (interview, 13 March 2013). 
Again, as with all of the main parties in Northern Ireland, civil society actors, pressure groups 
and industry experts appear to play a key role in the development of policy in the UUP, 
alongside the party’s formal membership. 
 The reform of membership registration in 2007 also saw the formalisation of a 
‘supporter’ category of UUP membership (UUP, 2014a). While these supporters do not enjoy 
any voting rights in intra-party elections they are consulted on party policy via email and 
through invitation to working groups (interview, 19 March 2013). In addition, the UUP website 
provides an option for the public to register and ‘Stay Informed’; again facilitating their 
involvement in the process (UUP, 2014b). Both of these initiatives were designed to boost 
party membership by incentivising supporters to take the next step to full membership 
(interview, 16 May 2013). Given the traditional vagaries which have surrounded the UUP’s 
organisational boundaries at grassroots level it could be argued that this does not constitute as 
considerable a dilution of formal members’ influence on intra-party affairs as suggested in 
other cases (see Scarrow, 2014; Gauja, 2013a: Ch. 6). Nonetheless, it is a noteworthy 







The supreme legislative body of Sinn Féin is the party’s annual conference, where any party 
organ can submit a motion to conference, including a local branch.4 Voting rights at this 
delegate meeting are bestowed upon several actors, the majority of which represent local 
branches (see Table 1). Sinn Féin does not stipulate that delegates be mandated. However, the 
party does attempt to ensure a direct link between members’ preference and their 
representatives’ vote by distributing agenda to branches in advance of conference. Some in 
Sinn Féin referred to healthy levels of policy debate at branch level, leading to strict 
‘mandation’ (interview, 22 April 2013). However, while extensive deliberation at branch level 
is in keeping with other accounts which stress the high-rate of grassroots activism in Sinn Féin 
(Maillot, 2005; Bean, 2007), the majority of interviewees accepted that such an ideal was often 
at the mercy of practical organisational realities and inconsistencies. A more likely scenario, 
therefore, appears to be that on account of the large number of motions debated – on average 
150-200 – delegates will only be mandated on contentious issues (interview, 9 April 2013).  
The quality of debate at Sinn Féin’s conference is also highly variable and issue-
dependent. Given the volume of motions debate is strictly time-limited. Sinn Féin’s conference 
also performs a multitude of non-policy-related functions. It is, perhaps above all else, an 
important public relations exercise for the party with speeches from the leadership garnering 
substantial media coverage. Sinn Féin has earned a reputation as an especially savvy party in 
respect of public relations and media management, an adeptness aided in large part by its 
comparatively high degree of internal cohesion (Spencer, 2006). As demonstrated in other 
cases, the policy-making capacity of conferences has suffered as parties have grown more 
appreciative of their ‘political marketing’ power (Lilleker, 2005; Seyd, 1999). Some Sinn Féin 
officials acknowledged the ‘curbing’ (interview, 8 May 2013) effect greater media coverage of 
conference proceedings has had on the nature of debate in recent years: ‘We are acutely aware 
that it’s not just what you say but where you say it, and who is able to hear it and how they 
then use that’ (interview, 25 April 2013). Critics have also argued that Sinn Féin’s conference 
is largely conducted for the optics, with dissenting views discouraged and debate strictly ‘stage-
managed’ by the leadership (see Bean, 2007: 119-121; Alonso, 2007: 126; 135-6; Frampton, 
2009: 117; 144). In response to these accusations, however, some in Sinn Féin acknowledged 
that changes in the party’s fortunes, size and the political context in which it operates has 
necessitated a ‘looser’ organisational culture, ‘one more tolerant of local initiative’ (interview, 
25 April 2013). Other observers have registered their surprise at the nature of debate and, at 
times, openly critical stance of delegates at Sinn Féin conferences. Doyle (2008:143) remarks 
that Sinn Féin’s conference is ‘unusual for the influence it still has on party policy’; and that 
despite growing PR demands, ‘it retains for party members its constitutional function of 
making policy’; and that ‘the nature of the debates and the number of motions passed at a 
typical [conference] reflect an institution with significant power and authority’. Those in Sinn 
Féin also referred to the party’s decision to call specially convened conferences  on ‘seismic’ 
issues in the past as evidence of its tolerance of ‘big, open, frank debate’ (interview, 22 April 
2013).5 
The notion of conference exercising considerable influence on the development of Sinn 
Féin policy finds some support in results from our candidate survey (Table 6). 76 per cent of 
Sinn Féin respondents deemed conference either ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ influential in terms of 
setting the party’s general policy direction. The authority of conference is closely matched by 
the party Executive, the elected body tasked with determining policy between conferences (75 
per cent); a result which tallies with long-held impressions of a strong national leadership and 
party centre (see below). Comparatively, the influence attributed to Sinn Féin’s conference is 
the highest of any of the ‘sovereign’ policy-making bodies in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, 
Sinn Féin respondents also attributed their membership and local associations with a higher 
degree of influence than any of the other parties, suggesting an active role for the grassroots in 
the process. Sinn Féin’s conference may therefore not be, as some suggest, a toothless body 
conducted mainly for show.  
Policy development in Sinn Féin is coordinated and directed by a central Policy Unit. 
Reflecting the party’s mandate in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland this unit is 
sub-divided, with separate bodies operating in both jurisdictions. The policy development 
mechanisms adopted by these two units largely mirror each other in terms of structure and 
operation. Long-standing practice (since at least 2002) has seen the party establish permanent 
‘Policy Advisory Groups’ (PAGs) to deal with short-term policy developments but also longer-
term policy (Sinn Féin, 2002). PAGs are organised along departmental lines and membership 
is regulated by the Policy Unit. These working groups are small in size (roughly 6-7 persons) 
with membership almost completely limited to the relevant minister and their advisors, 
committee members or elected spokespersons and Policy Unit staff. Some PAGs may also 
include party members who have expressed interest in an area or specific issue, however, for 




Table 6. Sinn Féin candidates’ perceptions of the influence of party organs on 















%         n 
 
Party leader 0 25 29 45 100 51 
Party executive 2 22 31 44 100 54 
Party officers 2 27 49 22 100 51 
Party council 10 27 49 14 100 49 
Parliamentary team (MPs) 12 39 31 18 100 51 
Assembly team (MLAs) 4 32 44 20 100 50 
Local councillors 12 49 25 14 100 51 
Party conference/AGM 6 18 35 41 100 51 
Local party associations 16 40 32 12 100 50 
Ordinary party members 24 35 31 10 100 51 
       




In drafting policy, usual practice sees PAGs firstly consult with relevant non-
governmental organisations.6 With this initial preparatory work conducted wider consultation 
then occurs with policy papers forwarded to regional executives for consideration, 
dissemination and feedback. These bodies afford delegate representation to the membership 
via smaller district executives and local branches. Larger monthly or quarterly regional 
meetings are held, focusing on a specific policy. These are open invitation to members and 
involve ‘Q&A’ sessions with elected representatives or officials. 
The impression provided by those in Sinn Féin is, therefore, of a top-down process, 
with policy fanning out to the wider party from the centre. Previous studies have revealed the 
degree of consultation conducted by Sinn Féin in policy-making to be considerable and a prized 
characteristic of the party (see Cassidy, 2005). While typical practice sees consultation occur 
mainly at regional level, Sinn Féin has demonstrated its adeptness at conducting large-scale, 
in-depth consultations with its grassroots on numerous issues in the past two decades.  This 
consultative process has utilised several mechanisms, namely branch visits and presentations 
by members of the Policy Unit and/or PAGs; single-issue or thematic ‘set-piece’ policy 
conferences; and large public consultations. The latter mechanism has attracted perhaps most 
attention in recent history. Colloquially dubbed ‘Republican Family meetings’ these ‘Town 
Hall’-style events were frequently held throughout the peace process in the 1990s (and early 
2000s) and more sporadically since then. While their use is largely limited to contentious issues 
they nevertheless represent a consultative tool with which the party is comfortable. 
Sinn Féin’s use of public meetings is noteworthy in that members of the wider public 
are afforded a role in the policy process. As a result, there is little in the way of distinction 
between ‘member’ and ‘supporter’ on those occasions. Rather than view such a scenario as a 
potential threat to the party’s institutional integrity and a dilution of the concept of membership 
those in Sinn Féin regarded it as a virtue. Those in Sinn Féin provided a coterie of explanations 
for such consultation. Meetings act as a ‘litmus test’ (interview, 20 March 2013) for party 
policy initiatives; allow the party to ‘feel the pulse of the community’ (interview, 28 March 
2013); protect against ‘group think’ (interview, 9 April 2013); afford policy ‘greater democratic 
legitimacy’ (interview, 8 May 2013); and ensure that the party ‘is not lost to the institutions’ 
(interview, 25 April 2013).     
Notably, in recent years Sinn Féin has introduced several initiatives designed to 
replicate the ‘Town Hall’ effect, facilitating consultation with both its membership and wider 
support base, but on a more regular basis. In 2011 the party reformed its membership model, 
establishing the new category of a ‘non-attached member’. Joining centrally rather than via a 
local branch this ‘member’ is, to all intents and purposes, a registered supporter who is largely 
exempt from the high rate of activism expected of a typical member. Sinn Féin officials 
explained how the comparatively high demands of Sinn Féin membership discouraged many 
of the party’s ‘latent supporters’ from becoming members, preventing the party from 
substantially increasing its membership base (interview, 4 March 2013). Crucially, while non-
attached members are unable to elect delegates to conference they are afforded a role in the 
policy-making process in other ways. The involvement of a growing number of actors outside 
the party’s traditional structures, ‘exponentially increased the responsibility on national 
leadership to up [its] game with regard to internal communication and consultation’ (interview, 
9 April 2013). As a result, the party appointed a new ‘Communications Officer’ to work closely 
alongside the Policy Unit. Recently adopted practice sees a weekly email bulletin distributed 
to the full membership base providing updates on policy, information on upcoming 
consultations and membership surveys (interview, 16 May 2014). Secondly, in 2010 Sinn Féin 
launched an ‘Online Supporter’ option, inviting members of the public to register their email 
address (Sinn Féin, 2014). In return a subscriber becomes a ‘grassroots online activist’ involved 
in the party’s policy process (among other things), receiving updates on policy activity and 
being consulted on policy issues.  Along with the party’s ‘non-attached member’ cohort these 
‘supporters’ – most likely those who would normally have attended ‘Town Hall’ meetings – 








The process of selecting policy reveals much about intra-party democracy. This study has 
demonstrated that the most influential actors within the process in Northern Ireland are 
parliamentarians, party leaders and dedicated policy staff. The common picture is one of policy 
‘trickling down’ from the ‘party in public office’ (Katz and Mair, 1995) to grassroots-level for 
consideration. Comparative research demonstrates that the ‘party in public office’ is becoming 
increasingly dominant in political parties vis-à-vis members, an ascendancy owed largely to 
the ‘professionalisation’ of party affairs and the growing resources associated with public 
office (Katz and Mair, 2002). In Northern Ireland there has been an undoubted 
professionalisation of the party policy process in recent times. Since the advent of devolved 
power-sharing in 1998 all parties have, to varying degrees, moved to employ professional 
policy staff to support the parliamentary party. On a related note, as parties move ‘closer’ to 
government parliamentary parties are more likely to dominate internal decision-making and 
become less responsive to their broader party. While applicable to all party systems, this issue 
is particularly salient in a consociational democracy such as Northern Ireland. Although some 
parties in the region actively reject the notion (e.g. Sinn Féin), ‘governmentalisation’ is a 
difficult force to resist and the evidence presented above suggests that such a trend has taken 
hold (see also Tonge et al 2014: 78). 
 Northern Ireland’s parties do provide members with opportunities to become involved 
in policy selection. All parties seek, in different ways, to ensure that policy secures members’ 
seal of approval. Party conferences, however, play an (increasingly) limited role in the process. 
For the DUP, UUP and most recently Alliance, conference – as it is traditionally conceived – 
does not perform a policy-making role. While conference constitutes the sovereign policy-
making authority for both the SDLP and Sinn Féin, legitimate doubts about its effectiveness as 
a vehicle for policy deliberation can be raised. Instead, Northern Ireland’s parties typically 
prefer other more discursive and private forums for policy development than conference. A 
key trend identified in this study is the provision of greater opportunities for ordinary members 
to register their views on policy. Parties have adopted several initiatives to consult with 
members to a greater extent than before, with internal lines of communication established or 
bolstered. While the extent to which party elites have a receptive ear for members’ views 
requires further research, opportunity exists nonetheless for such opinion to be aired.   
 Although Northern Ireland’s parties now provide members with greater opportunities 
to develop policy, it is also clear that they are equally keen to consult with actors outside their 
organisational boundaries. The degree of ‘policy outsourcing’ in the region appears 
considerable. Expert external stakeholders are often the parties’ first port of call when 
developing policy. Although routine in other cases, the influence of these actors on party policy 
outcomes in Northern Ireland remains largely under-analysed. In a further indication of the 
‘professionalisation’ of Northern Ireland parties post-devolution, focus groups have also 
become commonplace. So too have public meetings and consultations. While long-standing 
practice for Sinn Féin, both the UUP and SDLP have extended invitations to members of the 
wider community to attend meetings and express their views. Perhaps the most interesting 
development concerning ‘policy outsourcing’ is that affecting membership classification. 
Three of the five parties now afford ‘supporters’ a role in the policy process alongside formal 
members.  
The high degree of ‘policy outsourcing’ in Northern Ireland is perhaps inevitable given 
the parties’ small membership size. Producing representative policy is difficult given their 
weak social roots in the form of official membership. Collectively, members of the main 
political parties account for approximately just 6.7 per cent of the Northern Ireland electorate.7 
As a result, parties appear to have adopted mechanisms designed to tap sentiment and engage 
actors beyond their formal organisations. From a participatory standpoint this is not necessarily 
a negative development, as a key decision-making process is open to virtually anyone wishing 
to involve themselves. It does, however, raise potentially serious questions about the 
institutional integrity of the parties. If the views of supporters, focus groups, members of the 
public and external experts are privileged in the process, then legitimate concerns can be raised 
in relation to the meaning and value of conventional party membership. Of course, parties in 
Northern Ireland may experience greater pressures to ‘outsource’ when it comes to policy 
development. As outlined, a favoured condition of consociationalism is the capacity of party 
elites to consult with and engage ‘followers’ in their respective communities. Factional unity, 
a key ingredient of the consociational mix, is best achieved when parties enjoy extensive 
organisational ‘depth’ and when elites endeavour to ‘explain their behaviour and persuade the 
masses’ (Tsebelis, 1990: 8). Enjoying little in the way of ‘depth’ via formal membership (or 
through ancillary associations) and desirous to avoid accusations of being out of touch with 
those they represent, Northern Irish parties adopt a porous approach to their organisational 
parameters. Crucially, in an era where parties increasingly face accusations of illegitimacy and 
are viewed with growing levels of distrust (if not contempt) by citizens, the region’s parties 
may continue with this pursuit to garner greater community ‘buy-in’ when formulating policy. 
Such a development may have serious ramifications for the issue of intra-party democracy and 





1 The survey was conducted in 2011 as part of the UK module of the Comparative Candidate Survey project. The 
combined response rate for the five parties in this study was 35.4 per cent. For further information see: http://ls-
ewdsdnn.ces.strath.ac.uk/ukec/2011.aspx.   
2 Other accounts of the internal dynamics of the DUP have shown Special Advisors to play an active and 
influential (and primarily informal) role in the party’s policy-making process (see Tonge et al 2014). These actors 
are employed as aides to DUP ministers and several former advisors have moved directly into electoral politics. 
They could, therefore, be justifiably regarded as another strand of the DUP parliamentary party. 
3 At the time of the survey Alliance’s parliamentary ‘team’ consisted of just one MP. 
4 The running order of conference, including the motions to be debated, is determined by the party executive 
(Ard Chomhairle).  
5 Specially convened conferences have been called to consider the party’s support of the Good Friday Agreement 
(May 1998) and Policing and Justice in Northern Ireland (January 2007). 
6 Sinn Féin interviewees explained that focus groups are not conducted for purely policy development purposes. 
Focus groups are, however, used by the party’s ‘Elections Department’ during campaigns. 
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